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This analysis follows our recent study showing that Canadian public reimbursement
delays have lengthened from regulatory approval to listing decisions by public drug
plans and delayed public access to innovative medicines, mainly due to processes
following the Common Drug Review (CDR) and the pan-Canadian Oncology Drug
Review (pCODR). Public drug plans participate in a pan-Canadian Pharmaceutical
Alliance (pCPA) joint negotiation process before making decisions about whether or
not to reimburse a product reviewed through CDR and pCODR. This research aims
to report the findings from a comprehensive analysis of pCPA process times, times
to reimbursement by public payers in Canada, and to explore the opportunities to
reduce total delays in public reimbursement with a specific focus on the pCPA process.
An analysis was conducted of pCPA timelines with respect to making decisions
about products and indications reviewed through CDR/pCODR, and focusses on three
separate time components: time to begin negotiating, time spent negotiating, and time
to implement the negotiation (i.e., time to list) in each of nine jurisdictions (i.e., 10
provinces of Canada, excluding Quebec). This study demonstrates the role of post-
CDR/pCODR processes in large and lengthening delays to listing new medicines.
Notably, oncology products have experienced the longest increases in time to begin
negotiating and to complete negotiations. Trends in listing times post-pCPA across
provinces are less clear, however, it appears that consistency in terms of timelines across
provinces is not happening quite so smoothly for oncology products compared to non-
oncology products. Listing rates also appear to be declining for non-oncology products,
although this trend is less conclusive for oncology products. Challenges need to be
addressed to improve efficiency, transparency, and ultimately reduce pCPA timelines
and total timelines to public reimbursement. Suggested ways to improve and streamline
the listing process are: (1) transparent target timelines and associated performance
incentives for the pCPA and public plan decisions, (2) parallel HTA-pCPA processes
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to enable pCPA negotiations to start part-way through the HTA review and allow
pCPA negotiation information to be fed back into the HTA review, and (3) innovative
agreements that consider patient input and earlier coverage with real-world evidence
development.
Keywords: reimbursement, time to list, pan-Canadian Pharmaceutical Alliance, access to new medicines, health
technology assessment
INTRODUCTION
Our recent study, Factors influencing delays in patient
access to new medicines in Canada: a retrospective study of
reimbursement processes in public drug plans, confirmed that
Canadian public reimbursement delays have lengthened in time
from regulatory approval (i.e., upon issuance of a Notice of
Compliance, NOC) to listing decisions by public drug plans, with
increases of 22% in time to list in Quebec, 38% to first provincial
listing in any other jurisdiction, and 53% to country-wide listing
(Salek et al., 2019). Post-HTA to first provincial listing times,
which represents the best-case scenario in terms of the shortest
time, increased by 44%. The bulk of the time increase was
demonstrated to have occurred during the time period following
HTA recommendations by CDR and pCODR - that being the
time during which pCPA negotiations and provincial decisions
to list are made.
Canada is unique among many Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development countries, being that the nation
has universal medicare coverage for hospital and physician
services, but not universal drug coverage. As a result, Canada
has a collection of provincial and territorial drug plans, and
several federal drug plans that cover limited populations in
their own jurisdictions. Private drug plans act as a complement
to the public drug plans and cover the majority of working
Canadians for health services not covered under medicare or
public drug plans. An overview of the Canadian public system
reimbursement decision pathways for new medicines is provided
in Supplementary Figure S1.
In the absence of a single unique payer for pharmaceuticals,
the pCPA was established by the Council of Federation (a
collective of the provincial and territorial premiers) in 2010.
A pan-Canadian body, the pCPA was created for the purpose
of conducting joint public drug plan negotiations for innovative
and generic drugs in Canada being considered for reimbursement
through participating public drug plans. This includes drug plans
Abbreviations: ANSM, Agence Nationale de Sécurité du Medicament et des
Produits de Santé; CADTH, Canadian Agency for Drugs and Technology
in Health; CDIAC, Cancer Drug Implementation Advisory Committee; CDR,
common drug review; CEDAC, Canadian Expert Drug Advisory Committee;
EAMS, early access to medicines scheme; EMA, European Medicines Agency;
HTA, Health Technology Assessment; INESSS, Institut national d’excellence en
santé et en services sociaux (National Institute for Excellence in Health and
Social Services); LOI, letter of intent; MHRA, Medicines and Health Products
Regulatory Authority; NHS, National Health Service; NICE, National Institute
for Clinical Excellence; NOC, notice of compliance; NOCc, notice of compliance
with conditions; PAC, pCODR Advisory Committee; PAG, pCODR Provincial
Advisory Group; pCODR, pan-Canadian Oncology Drug Review; pCPA, pan-
Canadian Pharmaceutical Alliance; PLA, Product Listing Agreement; PMPRB,
Patented Medicine Prices Review Board; RWE, real world evidence.
of all 13 provinces and territories, with the province of Quebec
joining in October 2015 and the Federal Government joining
in February 2016 (three of the five federal plans participate).
The pCPA took several years to be developed, and only became
formally established with a permanent, government-funded staff
and office in 2015. The pCPA negotiated its first product in
2011. The goal of pCPA negotiations is to achieve “greater
value for publicly funded drug programs and patients” (Council
of the Federation Secretariat, 2017) by (1) capitalizing on the
combined purchasing power of public drug plans across multiple
jurisdictions, (2) improving the consistency of medication listing
decisions across the country, (3) achieving consistent pricing and
lower costs and increasing access to treatment options.
The scope of products under the purview of the pCPA is
principally all new drugs having been considered by the national
HTA review processes (specifically, the pan-Canadian Oncology
Drug Review, or pCODR and the Common Drug Review, or
CDR). However, the pCPA does undertake re-negotiations in
instances where the terms of a letter of agreement with the
pCPA have expired or where there are significant market changes.
This negotiation process starts when a collective of public drug
program makes a decision, based on the recommendations
of CADTH, about whether or not to negotiate for public
reimbursement. If the alliance decides to negotiate jointly for
the drug, one or two jurisdictions or the pCPA office takes
the lead for negotiations with the drug manufacturer. Ontario
and Nova Scotia governments tend to take the lead in this
process in the context of innovative drugs, while Saskatchewan
and Nova Scotia governments lead the process for generics
(Council of the Federation, 2014a). If an agreement is reached,
a LOI is signed by both the manufacturer and the pCPA, and
each participating jurisdiction will subsequently decide whether
and when to fund the drug through its own public drug
plan under terms agreed to in a confidential product-listing
agreement with the manufacturer (Council of the Federation,
2014a; Milliken et al., 2015).
There is a separate review process for innovative medicines
and generics. For generic medicines, the pan-Canadian Generic
Value Price Initiative, first implemented in April 2014 with
generic manufacturers, caps prices relative to the reference
innovative product’s transparent list price (Government of
Saskatchewan, 2018b). This cap can range from 25 to 85% of
the price assigned to the comparator innovator version for the
majority of generic medicines, depending on the number of
marketed versions. As of April 2018, 48 generic medicines are
capped at 18% of the innovator’s price and 20 medicines at 10%
of the innovator’s price (Council of the Federation Secretariat,
2017; Government of Saskatchewan, 2018a). Although generic
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prices negotiated through the pCPA are transparent and generally
apply to the entire market, innovator prices negotiated through
the pCPA are confidential and non-transparent and only apply to
the participating public payers.
Innovative medicines undergo price negotiations before PLAs
are implemented and products are listed. From inception to the
end of 2017, the pCPA made decisions or undertook negotiations
for a total of 309 new innovator products and additional
indications: 196 joint negotiations were successfully completed,
20 negotiations were unsuccessful, 36 negotiations were ongoing,
and 57 products were not selected for negotiation (pCPA, 2017).
The pCPA is facing many challenges. A backlog of products
requiring review began to accumulate in October 2015 and has
yet to be resolved. There is also a lack of transparency with respect
to review timelines, the negotiation process, and the specific
criteria used in decision-making. Furthermore, the provincial
implementation (i.e., a PLA) after a LOI is signed is still not
guaranteed and timing is unpredictable. For some medicines
or indications, pCPA may represent the last step through the
reimbursement pathway (i.e., where the product does not make
it to listing).
To address the challenges of implementing pCODR drug
recommendations, a new committee was formed in May 2016
by the Canadian Association of Provincial Cancer Agencies
(CAPCA) called the CDIAC. CDIAC’s role is to supplement
pCODR recommendations to the pCPA by “providing advice,
ideally prior to the initiation of pCPA negotiations, about how
new drugs can be integrated into existing funding algorithms
and to achieve greater consistency in drug funding decisions
across Canada” (CAPCA, 2018). This process remains extremely
non-transparent and there is little publicly-available information
about it.
The CDIAC has indicated it will consider trade-offs between
maximizing value in terms of patients’ needs and maintaining
consistency with pCODR recommendations. While patients
and industry recognize the need to promote optimal access
and improve implementation of drug funding decisions,
they are concerned about added delays in the process. They
also emphasized that reforms should not focus only on cost
containment (CAPCA, 2017). In their joint submission to
CAPCA, Innovative Medicines Canada and BIOTECanada,
two associations representing Canadian pharmaceutical
manufacturers, raised concerns about the potential for the
CDIAC process to overlap with and duplicate some of
the elements of the pan-Canadian Cancer Drug Funding
Sustainability Initiative (DFSI) (BIOTECanada, 2017). These
organizations questioned, for example, to what extent the
CDIAC would overlap with some of the work on assessment
and implementation currently conducted through pCODR and
the pCPA. Although CAPCA intends that CDIAC will operate
concurrently with and in a complementary fashion to existing
reviews, patients and industry have expressed concerns that it
constitutes an additional step in the funding process that will
result in further delays in access and to new treatments.
The task of the pCPA is somewhat challenged and complicated
by the numerous stakeholders involved, including, among
others: payers, including provincial and territorial drug program
branches, Federal drug programs, and CAPCA; the regulatory
bodies (Health Canada, PMPRB); the HTA bodies (CADTH,
INESSS); industry manufacturers (innovative), industry groups
(IMC, BIOTECanada, and CGPA); other cross-sector alliances
(CACDS, CAPDM, and CPhA), and patient groups (Council of
the Federation, 2014b). The pCPA is continuing the development
of guidelines and procedures in consultation with stakeholders
(pCPAO, 2018).
The guiding principles of the pCPA are somewhat aligned
with pCODR principles, being that they strive to be a model
of collaboration with industry and patient groups and whereby
overall economic impact is considered as “value.” The pCPA
reporting structure is different to that of the CADTH; the pCPA
reports to the Council of the Federation and is linked to the
Health Care Innovation Working Group and the Conference
of the Deputy Ministers of Health (pCPA, 2015). The pCPA
Executive Group includes the Drug Program Senior Executive
Lead from each participating jurisdiction and other executives,
directors and managers, who meet twice annually and on an
“as-needed” basis to provide strategic guidance through the
pCPA Steering Committee, and where applicable, through the
Drug Plan Directors and Staff (pCPA, 2015). The pCPA lacks
external bodies to ensure its accountability and transparency.
In comparison, the pCODR is steered by two advisory bodies:
the CADTH PAC, made up of provincial drug program
managers, and the PAG, made up of clinical experts within the
provincial drug programs. The PAC assists CADTH by giving
guidance and strategic advice to ensure that the pCODR process,
among other things, “is transparent, timely, fair, effective, and
engages key stakeholders” (pCODR, 2016). The PAG provides
advice to PAC and pCODR, focusing on operational issues
such as input to pCODR to ensure that “recommendations
meet the needs of participating provinces/territories and cancer
agencies for evidence-based recommendations that guide drug
funding decisions” and “may include considerations related
to the implementation of recommendations, advice around
consultation and information exchange, and information about
emerging trends in the development and use of cancer drugs”
(CADTH, 2018).
During 2012–2013, IBM Healthcare was contracted under
the direction of the Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term
Care and other partnering provinces and territories to study the
process of pCPA price negotiations (Council of the Federation,
2014b). Issues that were given consideration in their report
included whether pCPA goals – including non-price goals –
were acceptable, and whether a single, pan-Canadian negotiation
was better than multiple parallel negotiations. It was noted that
provincial subject matter expertise was key to the success of the
pCPA, but that resource constraints were limiting the capacity for
this in the pCPA context.
Overall, the IBM report (Council of the Federation, 2014b)
recommended that the pCPA initiate a “Secretariat Model,” that
would see pCPA employees in non-specialized roles working
as a team to inform and support the portfolio of drugs being
negotiated. Other process-related recommendations included
that the pCPA should establish clear time estimates, benchmarks
and targets for pCPA processes and subsequently report on
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the progress of such performance objectives in annual reports.
Additionally, it was recommended that the pCPA become more
predictable and flexible in its contracting process – including
by standardizing LOIs and PLAs – and that it begin to identify
complex issues early in the process. It was moreover concluded
that pCPA processes could by improved by way of pCPA-
led pre-negotiation briefings with manufacturers, HTA bodies
and patient groups. Most of these recommendations are yet
again the subject of the most recent guideline consultations
(pCPAO, 2018).
On September 30, 2014, the pCPA announced that it would
establish a secretariat that would be physically located within the
Ontario drug plan offices but administered separately (Jeffcott
and Manion, 2015). The provinces launched a stakeholder
consultation regarding the ongoing development of this
new pCPA secretariat, and stakeholder feedback greatly
mirrored the recommendations of the IBM report. More
specifically, consultation feedback included requests for greater
transparency and consistency of process, improvement in
timeliness and accountability, improvement in stakeholder
engagement (including allowing patient input into the process),
as well as other industry-specific asks (pCPA, 2016). It is
difficult to determine how many of these recommendations
have been implemented.
There is some evidence that the pCPA may be having positive
impacts for public payers and patient access to new innovative
medicines. For instance, the pCPA has announced that by
March 31, 2017, joint negotiations and generic pricing initiatives
led to savings to public budgets of $1.28 billion a year, of
which $925 million was due to innovative brand agreements,
and $355 million was due to generic price reductions (PDCI,
2017a). A previous study found that in the early days of pCPA
(2010–2013), there was a decrease in median listing timelines
observed in three provinces (Ontario, Manitoba, Prince Edward
Island) for products negotiated through pCPA, a net increase
in timelines observed in three provinces (New Brunswick, Nova
Scotia, Newfoundland), and no change in British Columbia,
Alberta, and Saskatchewan. The proportion of drugs listed that
had a completed pCPA negotiation went up in all provinces,
excluding Prince Edward Island where it remained the same.
Interestingly, only Manitoba saw both a significant reduction in
timelines and significant increase in the proportion of listings
(Milliken et al., 2015).
Despite the indication that some individual processes across
the drug review and funding decision pathway have had some
success in reducing their own timelines, Canada continues to
experience significant delays in listing of innovative medicines.
While parallel regulatory and HTA reviews – that is, pre-NOC
HTA reviews – are believed to expedite review processes, overall
listing timelines continue to increase and research indicates that
this is likely attributable to processes post-HTA, particularly for
oncology products (Salek et al., 2019). The aim of this research,
therefore, was to conduct a comprehensive analysis of pCPA
processing times and times to reimbursement by public payers
in Canada. This analysis is complemented by an exploration of
opportunities to reduce total delays in public reimbursement,
with a specific focus on pCPA process.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Study Design
Almost all public drug plans participate in the pCPA joint
negotiation process before making decisions about whether or
not to reimburse a product that has been reviewed by CADTH.
We conducted an analysis of pCPA timelines for products and
indications reviewed by CADTH, focusing on three separate time
components: time until negotiations are commenced; time spent
negotiating; and time to implement the negotiation (i.e., time to
list) in each of the jurisdictions that participate in pCPA review,
except for Quebec and the federal drug programs. These were
excluded from our analysis given that they joined pCPA later in
the course of our study period. The study design for this research
followed the STROBE Initiative’s recommendations for reporting
observational studies (von Elm et al., 2014). A study period of the
beginning of 2014 through to the end of 2016 was chosen given
the availability of pCPA data during this timeframe.
Data Sources
Data was collected by IQVIA to June 2016, and data to December
2016 was supplemented by the authors. Information from the
CADTH website was used to identify CADTH recommendations
for all new products and indications issued between 2012 to
December 2016 (including drug plan submissions), which were
then cross-referenced with the Health Canada NOC database
(Health Canada, 2017) in order to obtain the respective NOC
date. Information was furthermore drawn from the pCPA website
to identify negotiation status and outcomes up to the end of
December 2016. Provincial plan listing data was sourced through
IQVIA’s various provincial listing databases, and directly from
individual provincial drug plan websites.
Data Analyses
The measure used in our analysis is the mean or average, being
careful to include volumes whenever applicable. No adjustment
is made for changing volumes since much of the processes are
standardized and not meant to be impacted by different volumes.
Separate time segments were established as representative of
all relevant negotiation and listing decision points and action
points as follows: (i) from CADTH final recommendation to
beginning of pCPA negotiation; (ii) from start of negotiation
to completion of negotiation (including unsuccessful agreement,
where appropriate); (iii) from completed negotiation to public
listing in the first of the nine jurisdictions as well as in each of
the nine jurisdictions. The average time taken for products to be
reviewed in each of these three time segments was calculated. We
then conducted a time series analysis of 6 months increments for
each of the individual review components.
Subsequently, we calculated the total time taken for the pCPA
process, including the time taken by pCPA to start and complete
a negotiation. Time to start was calculated as the number of
calendar days between the date of CADTH recommendation to
the publication date of the first Active Negotiations list a drug
appeared in (i.e., start date). For this dataset we excluded products
that had already received funding in at least one province, thereby
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bypassing the pCPA process, even if they had not appeared in the
pCPA lists. Time to complete a negotiation was calculated as the
number of calendar days from the start date to the publication
date of the first Completed Negotiations list a drug appeared in.
This analysis was based on all products that had a completed
negotiation by December 2016 except for those products that
were either still being negotiated or waiting to be negotiated by
our December 31, 2016 cut off point. A time series analysis was
conducted by 6-months increments, providing additional insight
into the timelines at play. We excluded products that had no
start date (i.e., never appeared in an Active Negotiations list), and
products that appeared in the Completed Negotiations list that
was published on January 31, 2014 since these pre-date January
31, 2014, but their actual dates are unknown (older negotiations
that were completed in the earlier part of pCPA’s existence, 2011–
2013). From its inception to December 31, 2016, the pCPA had
completed 129 negotiations, 80 of which were completed during
our study period (PDCI, 2017b). Our study included 70 of those
80 completed negotiations.
For the time from completed negotiation to listing in the
nine jurisdictions, a timelines analysis was conducted for each
of the individual nine jurisdictions so as to indicate trends over
time in 6-months increments. Changes in listing rates were
examined for all products listed by the end of December 2016
that had a completed pCPA negotiation anytime after February
2014 unless otherwise mentioned (with the same aforementioned
exclusions, i.e., no start date, and January 31, 2014 Completed
Negotiations list).
A drug was considered ‘listed’ if it had a full or restricted
listing status, including if it obtained coverage under a special or
exceptional access program on the formulary of a provincial drug
plan or cancer agency. The absence of a drug name in a given
formulary was assumed to mean “not listed.” Time-to-listing for
provincial plans was evaluated as the number of calendar days
from the date of publication in a completed negotiation to the
date the product first appeared in a drug plan’s formulary (usually
the date of publication of the newsletter or bulletin published
by the drug plan). The exact day, month, and year of CADTH
submission and recommendation and of public reimbursement
were available from our data sources, whereas only the month
and year of pCPA negotiation start and end dates were available
(pCPA publishes all lists on the last day of each month). As such,
pCPA calculated times could be ±30 days. A sub-analysis of the
above timelines was conducted for oncology and non-oncology
products, respectively.
RESULTS
Total pCPA Time More Than Doubled in a
Period of 18 Months While the Number of
Negotiations Decreased
Figure 1 shows the time to start and to complete a negotiation
for all products with a completed negotiation in 2015 and 2016.
Both the time to start and the time to complete a negotiation
increased from 2015 to 2016 (Figure 1). Notably, the total time
taken for pCPA steps took more than twice as long in the second
half of 2016 as the first half of 2015 (357 days vs. 156 days, or
129% increase). The time spent in negotiations increased over the
same time period to a greater extent than did the time taken to
begin negotiations (a 150% vs. a 76% increase, respectively). In
contrast, the total number of completed negotiations decreased
over time from 21 in the first half of 2015 to 15 in the latter
part of 2016.
Total pCPA Time Has Increased More for
Oncology Products Than for
Non-oncology Products
Over the duration of our study period, the total time oncology
products spent in the pCPA process increased by 180% (from
131 to 371 days), while the time taken for non-oncology
FIGURE 1 | Time from CADTH (CDR and pCODR) recommendation to pCPA completed negotiation publication, from January 2015 to December 2016.
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products went up by 114% (Figure 2). Moreover, by the second
half of 2016, the total pCPA time for oncology products had
caught up to and surpassed that of non-oncology products. The
number of completed negotiations declined noticeably for non-
oncology products (from 16 to 11 from January–June 2015 to
July–December 2016), however, remained consistently low for
oncology products (from 5 to 4).
pCPA Is Taking Longer to Start or
Decline Negotiations
Figure 3 shows that, from the second half of 2014 to the
second half of 2016, the pCPA made a total of 121 decisions
on whether or not to negotiate products or indications (33
in oncology and 88 in non-oncology). Time to decision to
start or to decline a negotiation has increased 4.5-fold for
FIGURE 2 | Time from CADTH recommendation to pCPA completed negotiation publication, by oncology and non-oncology products and indications.
FIGURE 3 | Number of days from CADTH recommendation to start of pCPA negotiation or decision not to negotiate, and number of products.
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oncology products or indications, more than non-oncology
counterparts, despite steady oncology volumes, from 14 days
in the second half of 2014 to 78 days in the second half
of 2016, peaking at 120 days in the first half of 2016. Time
to decide to start or decline a negotiation for non-oncology
products or indications increased by 35% over the full course
of our analysis. The time was longer for non-oncology products
than oncology products in the second half of 2014, but had
become approximately equal for both categories of products
in the second half of 2016 (54 vs. 14 days in the second
half of 2014, 73 vs. 78 days in the second half of 2016).
Volumes have fluctuated significantly for non-oncology products
between periods but these do not necessarily follow the same
pattern as timelines.
There Is a Growing Backlog of Products
Awaiting Negotiation by pCPA
In total, by December 31, 2016, there were 33 CADTH
recommendations (conditional or positive) still waiting for a
pCPA decision to negotiate (Figure 4). The average number
of days to wait was 189 days and counting (∼6 months), for
submissions with no pCPA decision to negotiate by December
31, 2016, and nearly half (16/33) had been waiting longer
than 6 months.
pCPA Negotiations Appear to Be Taking
Longer
The time spent in negotiation increased considerably between
the first half of 2015 and the end of 2016, particularly for
oncology products (Figure 5). During this time, oncology
product negotiation time increased threefold (from 103 to
328 days), while non-oncology product negotiation time more
than doubled (from 117 to 266 days).
The dramatic increase in times observed in 2016 was not the
result of outliers, especially for oncology products (Figure 6). Six
of the seven oncology products that had completed negotiations
in 2016 took 250 or more days to complete and one of these
took over 400 days to complete, while in 2015, nine out of 11
negotiations took 150 days or less to complete and the longest
two took 214 days. Whereas nearly all 27 non-oncology products
negotiated in 2015 took less than 200 days to be negotiated, more
than half of the 24 products negotiated in 2016 took more than
200 days, with four taking longer than 400 days, and one taking
nearly 800 days (Figure 7). By December 2016, there were 24
products still under negotiation, and 14 of these had been under
negotiation for more than 6 months (Figure 8).
Provincial Times to List Have Converged
Following pCPA Negotiations, but Listing
Rates Have Fallen
Over the time period under review, average listing times
in individual provinces were long, and were variable across
provinces ranging from 495 to 627 days from NOC for non-
oncology products (median 582 days), and from 415 to 657 days
for oncology products (median 468 days) (Supplementary
Figures 2, 3). Time from pCPA negotiation to listing represents a
small proportion of total time to listing, however, there is great
variability here as well, ranging from 30 to 130 days for non-
oncology products (median 69), and from 45 to 360 days for
oncology products (median 89 days). Timelines are generally
shorter in Ontario, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta and British
Columbia, and longer in New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince
Edward Island and Newfoundland and Labrador. Provinces with
longer overall times to listing generally are the same provinces
with longer post-pCPA timelines. [Note that products vary
between provinces based on the unique listings of each province].
FIGURE 4 | Number of submissions that received a conditional or positive CADTH final recommendation with no negotiation start date or a decision not to negotiate
by December 31, 2016.
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FIGURE 5 | Time of negotiation, oncology products and non-oncology products, between January 2015 and December 2016.
FIGURE 6 | Scatterplot of pCPA negotiation times for oncology products and indications, 2015 and 2016.
FIGURE 7 | Scatterplot of pCPA negotiation times for non-oncology products and indications, 2015 and 2016.
For non-oncology products that had completed pCPA
negotiation in the first half of 2016, average times to listing had
converged to under 100 days in each of the nine jurisdictions
(Figure 9). In the majority of provinces, this represented a
decrease in timelines post-pCPA over the study period, although
the provinces of Ontario and Alberta experienced a net increase
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FIGURE 8 | Time spent in negotiation for submissions still incomplete by December 31, 2016 (N = 24).
FIGURE 9 | Time to listing from pCPA completed negotiation for non-oncology products and indications that had completed the pCPA negotiation process, by
completed negotiation date, for the review period ending on December 31, 2016. AB, Alberta; BC, British Columbia; MB, Manitoba; NB, New Brunswick; NL,
Newfoundland and Labrador; NS, Nova Scotia; ON, Ontario; PEI, Prince Edward Island; SK, Saskatchewan.
in the number of days to listing (44 and 16 days, respectively).
For oncology products, no discernible trend can be observed
as an outcome of pCPA negotiations in terms of resulting
time to list in individual provinces, due to variability across
periods (Figure 10).
In contrast, listing rates by December 2016 for non-
oncology products and indications had declined in all
provinces where pCPA negotiations were completed in
January–June 2016 as compared to earlier periods (Figure 11).
On average, listing rates were 30–40% in the last period
under review compared to 60–90% earlier on. For oncology
products, listing rates were and remain generally higher
than for non-oncology products both initially and at the
end of the period under review, and no discernible trend
can be observed as an outcome of pCPA negotiations in
terms of listing rates in individual provinces due to small
numbers (Supplementary Figure S3). However, British
Columbia, Ontario, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia all
had lower listing rates for products with pCPA negotiations
completed in January–June 2016 compared to July–December
2014 (Figure 12).
DISCUSSION
This study demonstrates the role of the pCPA joint negotiation
process in lengthening delays to listing new medicines in Canada’s
public drug plans. Notably, oncology products have seen the
longest increases in both times to start negotiating and time spent
in negotiations.
The cause of the bottleneck observed within the timelines
associated with the pCPA is likely to be multifactorial – and
may perhaps include a backlog of applications, a lack of human
resource capacity, delays in communications between the pCPA
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FIGURE 10 | Time to listing from pCPA completed negotiation for oncology products and indications that had completed the pCPA negotiation process, by
completed negotiation date, for the review period ending on December 31, 2016. AB, Alberta; BC, British Columbia; MB, Manitoba; NB, New Brunswick; NL,
Newfoundland and Labrador; NS, Nova Scotia; ON, Ontario; PEI, Prince Edward Island; SK, Saskatchewan.
FIGURE 11 | Percentage of non-oncology products and indications negotiated by pCPA that had achieved listing by December 2016, by province. N, number of
pCPA LOIs in each respective period. AB, Alberta; BC, British Columbia; MB, Manitoba; NB, New Brunswick; NL, Newfoundland and Labrador; NS, Nova Scotia;
ON, Ontario; PEI, Prince Edward Island; SK, Saskatchewan.
and manufacturers, or process or governance issues. Previous
individual provincial negotiations may have been faster in some
provinces, although would have been subject to duplication and
potentially resulting in a different value proposition for different
payers. The fact that the pCPA now has to manage and meet the
needs of multiple payers with different budget and beneficiary
realities may well be resulting in more complex price negotiations
and thereby causing delays.
The “buy-in” to pCPA by the provincial drug plans has
been good: once a CDR or pCODR review is completed,
individual provinces/territories may then negotiate with the
manufacturer without pCPA. Alternatively, provinces/territories
may negotiate collectively if the pCPA becomes involved and
decides that joint pan-Canadian negotiations for the drug will
occur. Approximately 91% of positive and conditional CADTH
recommendations between January 2012 and December 2015
proceeded to either a pCPA negotiation or an individual
provincial negotiation, and approximately 72% of all CADTH
recommendations went to a pCPA negotiation (Salek et al.,
2019). However, the pCPA seems to be faced with a number of
challenges, which ultimately has a substantial impact on delays in
patient access to new medicines. It is hoped that the results of this
study may identify processes and timelines that require attention
and remedial action.
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FIGURE 12 | Percentage of oncology products and indications negotiated by pCPA that had achieved listing by December 2016, by province. N, number of pCPA
LOIs in each respective period. AB, Alberta; BC, British Columbia; MB, Manitoba; NB, New Brunswick; NL, Newfoundland and Labrador; NS, Nova Scotia;
ON, Ontario; PEI, Prince Edward Island; SK, Saskatchewan.
Currently, there are few guidelines in place and a general
lack of clarity with respect to the pCPA process – particularly
regarding any internal timeline targets governing various steps
in the review process. It is not completely clear what criteria are
used by the pCPA in determining whether or not to proceed with
negotiations for a particular product, although there appear to be
signs of prioritization (Salek et al., 2019). It is possible that the
increase in pCPA timelines observed in this study and an earlier
study (Salek et al., 2019) could be in part due to the lack of target
timelines, and the lack of transparent criteria to negotiate may
also be creating inequalities in timelines for different medicines.
It is difficult to determine whether the pCPA actually has
improved the listing processes and whether it can ever meet
all needs of such a diverse public payer community. While it
may have reduced the burden on individual provinces, it has
increased overall times to listing (Salek et al., 2019), and reduced
the number of drugs available (Milliken et al., 2015).
This study also demonstrates that trends in listing times post-
pCPA across provinces are less clear, however, it appears that
consistency in timelines is not happening quite so smoothly for
oncology products compared to non-oncology products. Listing
rates also appear to be declining over time for non-oncology
products, although this trend was less conclusive for oncology
products. This could also be an indication of slower listing times
(longer than 6 months) for those products, not captured in
our study.
It is possible that the fact that there are different provincial
formularies is contributing to the problem of long delays to listing
and longer negotiations. Provinces all start the process of making
decisions about listing new drug products with different lists
of drugs. A recent study by the PMPRB found that out of 729
drugs (molecules) that had been selected for analysis, less than
half (48%) were eventually listed in each of the 11 public drug
plans analyzed, 34% were listed in at least six (more than half
of) plans, and 18% were listed in fewer than six (less than half
of) plans (PMPRB, 2018). Despite the fact that terms may be
negotiated jointly amongst jurisdictions by way of an LOI, it may
be the case that the LOI cannot be implemented uniformly across
jurisdictions due to differing budget considerations, willingness
to pay and affordability in relation to their respective existing
formularies and populations. The United Kingdom offers one
example of a national formulary – that is, the British National
Formulary (BNF) – that informs formularies in all regions
in respect of all products marketed in the United Kingdom.
Each region of the United Kingdom has its own Therapeutic
Committee that decides what products to reimburse on the
basis of their own budgetary considerations, but at a minimum
must list those medicines with a positive recommendation from
the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE)
within 90 days. Additional medicines listed in the BNF could
be selected for reimbursement in individual regions by using
an FP10 government prescription form (NICE, 2018). This
coordinated, national system seems to have resulted in timeliness
and consistency in reimbursement across the country (Curtis and
Goldacre, 2018). The mandate letter of Canada’s Federal Health
Minister indicates that the creation of a national formulary is
being considered, however, no further details are provided about
the modalities or timeliness strategies underlying this proposal
(Office of the Prime Minister, 2015, 2017).
The situation in Canada is unique, being that there is a
centralized regulator, HTA (CADTH, for all provinces except for
Quebec) and price negotiation process, but also decentralized
formulary decision makers and payers. In comparison, the EU
has a centralized regulator in place, but also multiple HTAs, price
negotiators, formulary decision-makers and payers.
Although Canada was among the first to introduce the use of
economic appraisals and the concept of trade-off and utility in the
assessment of pharmaceuticals, the country continues to struggle
in terms of its listing and reimbursement processes because the
standardized HTA and joint price negotiation processes have not
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been able to adequately meet the needs of the different payers,
and different payers have continued to make reimbursement
decisions independently. Following suit, several European
countries have recently attempted to work together toward
the mutual recognition of HTAs and joint price negotiations
to address discrepancies in reimbursement across the region
through the BeNeLuxA Initiative. However, BeNeLuxA’s limited
experience to date includes a price negotiation that was
terminated as the result of the group failing to agree on an
acceptable price across the region (BeNeLuxA, 2017). Regardless
of this, a made-in-Canada solution can still model an appropriate
solution based on the best practices observed in other countries.
The EMA, Health Canada, and CADTH all have mandatory
maximum review timelines, which prevent reviews from
continuing endlessly. Additionally, CADTH and the EMA both
have clear, mandated review milestones setting timelines for both
reviewer and manufacturer responses. Moreover, each of these
bodies has performance targets with resourcing/funding being
tied to performance. EU member states are even mandated to
make listing decisions within 3–6 months of EMA marketing
authorization (Council of the European Union, 1988), and
evidence shows that half of EU states do make decisions within
4–10 months (Millson et al., 2016).
In contrast, public payers in Canada do not have target
or mandated timelines for listing products post-marketing
authorization, post-HTA recommendation or post-pCPA
negotiation. Moreover, neither positive/conditional HTA
recommendations nor pCPA LOIs are binding on the public
payers. As a result, some recommendations are never followed
through with and some LOIs are never implemented or can
be delayed – potentially indefinitely. Although our study
reveals that time to list following pCPA LOIs has declined for
many provinces, listing rates appear to have declined over the
same periods which could also be an indication of delayed
listing not yet captured in our study. In addition, the poor
performance of public reimbursement timelines and listing
volumes in Canada compared to the majority of EU states
indicate that target timelines for the pCPA and/or for the entire
reimbursement system could only benefit the system in terms
of timeliness and accountability to patients and manufacturers
(Millson et al., 2016).
Given the delays we observed during the pCPA process, we
also recommend that pCPA-led pre-negotiation meetings with
manufacturers, patient groups and other stakeholders would
likely improve the listing process and potentially enable parallel
review opportunities.
Salek et al. (2019) revealed that the parallel review opportunity
offered by CADTH, called pre-NOC or pre-NOC with conditions
(NOC/c) for CDR and pCODR review processes has been largely
successful in reducing times from marketing authorization
to HTA recommendations and, in some cases, to public
reimbursement. The parallel review program has now been
expanded to include all classes of drugs – i.e., beyond only
drugs with priority review by Health Canada (CADTH-pCODR,
2017), effectively allowing drug marketing authorization and
HTA reviews to proceed in parallel for the latter part of the
marketing authorization review process, thereby reducing the
time to negotiate and eventually make the drug accessible
to the public. Since March 2018, all CDR and pCODR
submissions can be submitted up to 6 months ahead of
the anticipated NOC or NOC/c date, with the potential of
completing the HTA review at the same time as the NOC
is being given consideration and shaving off up to 6 months
in the entire time to list continuum. Although we believe
parallel reviews to be advantageous and promising in terms
of their ability to reduce time lags and backlogs, there are
still barriers to its full adoption and indeed they are under-
utilized (pCODR, 2014; CADTH, 2016; CADTH/pCODR, 2018;
Salek et al., 2019).
The above noted benefits of a parallel review process raises
the question of whether the same concept may be extended
to both HTA review and negotiation phases if based on a
pre-determined timeline that is similar to that advanced by
CADTH. Alternatively, negotiations could commence part-way
through the CDR or pCODR process, as applicable – perhaps
at a specified time or after some predetermined key analysis
milestones indicating that a positive HTA outcome is likely.
Currently, negotiations begin after the CDR or pCODR review
have been completed, and in fact, there appears to be a growing
“gap” in time between when the CADTH recommendation has
been published, and when the pCPA negotiation begins. This
trend has been especially notable for oncology products, reaching
the better part of 1 year by the latter half of 2016. The CDIAC
process could be partly to blame, but there is insufficient evidence
to draw any conclusions.
The pCPA considers many factors beyond cost effectiveness
and product price in its deliberations, including some already
given consideration by the anticipated drug plan, such as the
treatment landscape, comparators’ prices, and affordability. As
pCPA price negotiations unfolded, decisions around pricing
could be fed back to the HTA so that it could re-evaluate
cost effectiveness, even once therapeutic value had already been
shown. The final result would be an HTA recommendation
at a cost already negotiated in parallel, which would provide
additional certainty to the provinces of the appropriateness of
the price point. As an example of this type of scheme, in
the United Kingdom, both NICE and the Scottish Medicine
Consortium (SMC) enable manufacturers to submit a Patient
Access Scheme (PAS) – a confidential discount – part-way
through the HTA review, which can increase the possibility of a
product obtaining a positive HTA recommendation (ABPI/DOH,
2013). In the United Kingdom, therefore, this provides
the added certainty that a positive NICE recommendation
effectively guarantees reimbursement across formularies in
the United Kingdom. In Canada, such a parallel feedback
loop could replace the CDR’s “Do not list at the submitted
price” recommendation with a positive “List” recommendation
and result in more streamlined pCPA negotiation and public
listing processes.
We note that it is promising that Health Canada has begun
a consultation on better aligning its own expedited review
decision criteria with the rest of the health system. This offers an
opportunity for a streamlined pathway from an end to end system
perspective, i.e., from NOC to listing.
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In addition to the above, there are several new models
being explored or implemented in other jurisdictions with the
objective of accelerating patients’ access to medicines. In the
United Kingdom, the EAMS makes marketing authorizations
decisions for products for “life threatening or seriously
debilitating conditions” on the scientific opinion of the
United Kingdom regulator (MHRA). The EAMS allows for this
alternate review process in order to “provide access to Promising
Innovative Medicines (PIM) that do not yet have a marketing
authorization when there is a clear unmet medical need” (MHRA,
2014; NICE, 2016). In these situations, NICE will commence an
HTA evaluation during the EAMS period of 70–90 days before
marketing authorization is expected (MHRA, 2014; NICE, 2016).
Under this system, the first NICE review Committee decision is
published within 3 months of marketing authorization, rather
than the usual 6 months. Products recommended by NICE are
required to be reimbursed within 90 days of publication of the
guidance (MHRA, 2014; NICE, 2016), although this requirement
is reduced this to 30 days for EAMS products (MHRA, 2014;
NICE, 2016). Consequently, the EAMS process can potentially
cut down on more than half of the reimbursement timeline from
the time of marketing authorization, while offering a valuable
opportunity for early dialog amongst government and arm’s
length bodies about product uptake within the NHS (O’Connor
et al., 2017). Although limited to specific medicines considered to
be in urgent need, the EAMS program demonstrates that faster
and more efficient pathways are possible – in particular where
parallel reviews are made possible and deadlines are mandated.
In contrast, currently there is no established faster or
accelerated pathway for the reimbursement processes that
prioritize the medicines that Health Canada has identified fill an
unmet need (e.g., priority review products). Except for the pre-
NOC HTA process, which could shave off potentially 6 months
after NOC in the total time to list, there is no guarantee that
the provinces will prioritize those products through the pCPA
negotiation process or their own respective provincial listings. In
fact, our study demonstrates that total time spent through pCPA
negotiation has increased by more than 6 months (201 days)
between early 2015 and late 2016, thereby offsetting any potential
gains from taking advantage of the pre-NOC HTA process. An
earlier study (Salek et al., 2019) demonstrated that products listed
in 2015–2016 that had a pre-NOC HTA review still saw a 25%
increase in total time to list (84 days) compared to products listed
in 2013–2014. The full impact of the worst of the pCPA delays will
be felt with 2017 listings.
Italy’s unique early access strategy represented by the Law
648/96 (Ministerial Decree 2003) (Ministero and della Salute,
2017) offers another example of a listing process that provides
patients early access to new medicines. This law allows the
use of three types of medical products, reimbursed by National
Health System: innovative drugs for which the sale is authorized
abroad, but not in Italy; drugs which have not yet received an
authorization, but have undergone clinical trials; and drugs to be
used for a therapeutic indication different from the one which
had been authorized (off-label). According to Law 648/96, public
health institutions can request early access to medications by
submitting a written request to AIFA, underlying the evidence of
efficacy as reported in the scientific literature (Balasubramanian
et al., 2016; p. 693; Bertozzi et al., 2016). The request is discussed
by the Technical and Scientific Commission (CTS) of AIFA
and approved for clinical use if deemed appropriate. Thus, the
medication becomes available to patients with inclusion and
exclusion criteria set by AIFA. In addition, the medication is
subject to a program of surveillance and should be reported in
a list which is periodically updated.
The study of Russo et al. (2010) investigated the multistep
pathway of oncology products during from 2006 to 2008, from
the EMA approval, pharmaceutical companies to submit price
and reimbursement dossier to the Agenzia Italiana del Farmaco
(AIFA), approval by AIFA (the national agency responsible for
market authorization of medicines in Italy,) and finally addition
to regional/district/hospital formularies and public tender for the
purchase of medicines in each Italian region (IR) resulting in
patient access. The overall mean time required before patients
access was 2.3 years, with the EMA accounted for the greatest
proportion of time (31.8%). AIFA approval took an average of
261 days (28.2% of the total time). Highest variability in times,
however, was shown by the pharmaceutical companies and Italian
regions. Early access was seen for oncology product authorized
with a risk-sharing agreement, whereas having a compulsory
formulary delayed access.
Navarria et al. (2018) investigated the existing Performance-
Based Risk-Sharing Arrangements (PBRSAs) for reimbursements
in Italy. PBRSAs are applied to oncology drugs/biologics, and/or
high-cost drugs, many with rapid/conditional approval. It was
found that savings of only €121 million were made from a total of
€3696 million paid. 94.4% of the expenditure was not considered
for refund largely because a high percentage of patients had
incomplete or interruption of treatment not exempted in the
negotiation agreement, as well as health care center inefficiencies
“preventing activation of the reimbursement procedure.” A
recently introduced “success fee” strategy for performance-based
agreements was also described wherein payment is due only
for patients who respond to treatment. An ex post payment
to the NHS is made for responders, with the cost of therapy
for non-responders covered by the drug company. This is a
significant change from the previous ex post reimbursement
by pharma companies for non-responders with the cost of
therapy for responders covered by the NHS at the outset.
However, the time to reimbursement was not investigated
in this study.
In France, the ANSM, operating under that national public
health code, also provides an early access program called
Temporary Authorizations for Use (ATU) that allows the
exceptional use of medicinal products that have not yet received
marketing authorization and that have been subject to clinical
trials (Balasubramanian et al., 2016; ANSM, 2017). An important
consideration for manufacturers when considering either the
Italian or French pathways is that, on one hand – while products
will be funded through these mechanisms – the French ATU
requires the manufacturer to refund any difference between the
ATU price and final negotiated price for reimbursement. On the
other hand, the Italian system does not require manufacturers to
pay back the difference once the reimbursed price is negotiated.
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The Cancer Drugs Fund (CDF) in England affords another
example of a program that provides more timely access to the
most promising new cancer treatments, and provides better
value for money for taxpayers. The CDF was initially set up
by the Government in 2011 as a temporary solution to “help
patients gain access to cancer drugs not widely available via the
NHS,” as they had been rejected by NICE for not being cost
effective. After public consultation, in July 2016 the program
was amended and relaunched under NICE and NHS England as
it was no longer sustainable or desirable (Adcock and Powell,
2015; Hazell, 2015). NICE now issues guidance for coverage
with evidence development, essentially becoming a “managed
access” fund, paying for new cancer drugs for a limited period
of time until they are “definitively approved or rejected by
NICE” based on the additional evidence developed. From 2016
onward, each drug in the CDF has evaluation criteria and
a timescale for effectiveness to be re-assessed. In contrast,
in Canada, there is no managed fund for cancer products.
The CDIAC is the most recently formed collective to address
the issue of cancer medicines funding, however, so far there
is insufficient information of its impact on timeliness and
effectiveness in providing access to the most innovative cancer
treatments to patients. Given the evidence in our study, oncology
products are the most impacted by pCPA delays and overall
time to listing.
Currently in Canada, either the CDR or the pCODR may
recommend that a drug be listed at a lower price than what
was submitted by the manufacturer (if convinced of additional
therapeutic benefit vs. comparators but found to not be cost-
effective) or to not list at a submitted price (if convinced
of similar therapeutic benefit to comparators). Limiting pCPA
negotiations to the subject of price alone may contribute to longer
negotiations, if the uncertainty is high, and/or if the disparity
between the price points of manufacturer and payer is too far
apart. Introducing other metrics into the terms of an agreement,
such as real-world patient data (RWD) on performance
outcomes, physician or patient input, or other health system
utilization data could help resolve these complexities, reduce the
time spent in negotiations, and improve access to patients from
the time of marketing authorization. For example, in Scotland
the SMC has the Patient and Clinician Engagement pathway that
allows for physician and patient input if the HTA evaluation for
an orphan product (drug that treats a rare disease) is heading
toward a negative recommendation. In the Canadian context,
allowing patient input was indeed highlighted in the IBM report
and stakeholder input to consultations in 2014 as a viable means
for expediting drug product reviews (Council of the Federation,
2014b; pCPA, 2016).
The problems inherent to providing patients access to
innovative medicines at acceptable prices and in a timely way
may, in part, be addressed by introducing into listing agreements
requirements for developing and applying real-world evidence
(RWE). RWE could reduce development costs and become an
important means for manufacturers to demonstrate the value of
medicines to payers, thus improving the probability of getting
reimbursement. Many managed entry agreements or risk sharing
deals (an agreement whereby both parties agree to reimburse
earlier with conditions to revisit with post-market data) in
Europe are based on real world data (RWD). Risk sharing
schemes are also common in Italy, for example, to secure
reimbursement for cancer treatment, and registries are in place
to track outcomes (Pessina et al., 2006). Likewise, the EMA
is thinking about fast-tracked, or faster licensing with ongoing
submission of RWD during the regulatory review (Bruce, 2016;
Cave, 2016). However, at the current scale of data infrastructure
and experience with RWE, and of level of resourcing, payers
and manufacturers alike mostly resort to price and volume
types of discounts.
Another constraint in Canadian review processes is likely
attributable to the fact that, after a LOI is signed, the participating
jurisdictions either work with the manufacturer on a product-
and jurisdiction-specific PLA or work on an implementation
of the terms agreed to in the LOI. This implementation
is not a second negotiation; however, it is an additional
administrative step. It is possible that the multiplicity of interests
and actors at play, involving different manufacturers across
varying jurisdictions, could be contributing to additional delays
in translating the terms of the LOI into contractual form. This
results in inconsistent country-wide listings, which the pCPA
process is not designed to resolve.
A move to create a single PLA or a standard PLA template
for all the negotiating jurisdictions would greatly reduce
administrative burdens for all parties such as those identified
above, while still allowing individual jurisdictions to opt out
of or to alter certain standard terms to suit the unique needs
of their population. This was one of the recommendations out
of the IBM report and subsequent stakeholder consultations
(Council of the Federation, 2014b; pCPA, 2016). The advantages
for individual jurisdictions of this type of standardized, but
customizable agreement would be the resulting balance between
efficiency and transparency across jurisdictions and the ability
of individual provinces to contract as per their own needs and
laws. A set of standardized terms in PLAs, including certain
terms that provinces are allowed to vary, should be drafted and
communicated to all relevant stakeholders.
Limitations
Our study had several limitations as a result of lacking or
inadequate data being available. Our analysis excludes data for
products and indications that had second letters of intent but no
associated CADTH review and recommendation. Our analysis
also excludes products negotiated by pCPA before January 31,
2014, due to the fact that the pCPA only began publishing active
negotiation and completed negotiation lists in real-time after
this date and published retroactive negotiations with a posted
date of January 31, 2014. Consequently, these are considered
to be artificial dates. Moreover, several products with verifiable
negotiation completion dates in 2014 were excluded if they had
no corresponding negotiation start dates.
Provincial listing data for Quebec was excluded from
this analysis, as Quebec only joined the pCPA process
in late 2015 and therefore lacked a complete dataset.
Furthermore, provincial listing data from other provinces
may be excluded for products and indications that were
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reviewed by way of a specialized program or that were
funded on a case-by-case basis outside of formularies or drug
program budgets.
The dates used in our analyses should be considered as being
±30 days in terms of accuracy, as actual pCPA negotiation start
and end dates are not reported but rather are reported as being
the last day of the respective month.
Data limitations also prevented meaningful analyses
that could have been relevant to this issue. For example,
pCPA has stopped reporting the results of negotiations for
products/indications about which it does not ultimately negotiate
(i.e., products/indications that are assigned outcomes such as
“Do Not Negotiate” and/or “Provincial Negotiations”). These
circumstances hinder meaningful or conclusive performance
trends analyses for these drugs (i.e., time to decision to not
negotiate). Moreover, pCPA does not identify the source of a
request for negotiation – whether it be the manufacturer’s HTA
submission or initiation by the drug plan, thereby hindering our
understanding of trends in how negotiations are prioritized by
pCPA. pCPA also does not identify the type of negotiation: re-
negotiation for previously-negotiated product, or negotiation for
new product/indication – making it difficult to understand the
factors affecting pCPA timelines. The pCPA’s own reporting does
not reveal its own methodology for reporting their timelines,
making it difficult to replicate and re-evaluate. Lack of data
and information on cancer drugs reviewed under the CDIAC
also prevents us from truly understanding the processes and
timelines at play for oncology drugs during the time they spend
between pCODR and pCPA. Therefore, for all the reasons
outlined above, our timelines analyses may not reflect statistics
reported by pCPA.
CONCLUSION
The Canadian public drug reimbursement system faces many
challenges in reducing delays in listing new drugs, and much
of this is attributable to pCPA process. This paper suggests that
the pCPA process is fraught with challenges and requires a great
deal of support in order to improve its efficiency, transparency,
and ultimately to reduce its own timelines and total timelines to
public reimbursement in Canada. There are many possible ways
to improve and streamline the listing process, but the relative
merits of each needs careful consideration, and the possibility
that several solutions can be implemented in parallel must be
further explored.
Several examples from other countries suggest that there is
a way forward to address each of the challenges and ultimately
to reduce timelines. We suggest at minimum three key changes
to the pCPA process that would contribute toward reduced
timelines, and – if implemented concurrently –could potentially
cut total timelines significantly. This would be of great benefit
to Canadian patients, drug plans, and the health care system.
These include:
1. Transparent and predictable target timelines:
Transparent and predictable target timelines are necessary
for both the pCPA process (from end of CADTH
recommendation to pCPA negotiation completion), as
well as for public plan decisions from NOC (end to
end target timelines). This would provide a clear and
predictable overall process, and would include guidelines
for prioritization. A proper accountability framework
would be needed to assess pCPA’s progress. These timelines
should also represent a meaningful improvement over
the current state, for example achieving at least a 50%
reduction in post-NOC timelines.
2. Parallel HTA-pCPA process: The possibility of pCPA
discussions starting part-way through the HTA review
should be explored, in such a manner as to allow pCPA
negotiation information to be fed back into the HTA
review and recommendation and to further refine the pCPA
negotiation agreement.
3. Innovative agreements that consider patient input and
earlier coverage with real-world evidence development:
A process should be developed that would allow patients
to input directly into pCPA negotiations as well as to
reach earlier, interim agreements that are conditional
on real-world evidence development. This could become
part of a parallel-review process with HTA whereby real-
world evidence would be developed and then both the
HTA and pCPA processes could be re-opened and occur
simultaneously, without causing Canadian patients to wait
for these deliberations indefinitely.
Other changes, such as establishing standardized PLA
templates, could also improve the process and reduce timelines.
Despite certain best practices noted from other jurisdiction,
more discussion is needed on “made in Canada” solutions, but
this at a minimum requires a collaborative approach between
review agencies and with industry, payers, and clinicians to help
improve the process going forward.
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to missing data on actual negotiation start and completion dates).
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